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NATIONALISM AND CLASS AS FACTORS 
IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 
I. Some Preliminary Considerations 
The concepts of class and nationality have been problematic ever 
since they entered the broad political discourse of European intellectuals in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Long before they were categories employed by 
social scientists, their use by political activists and publicists carried with it  
values, expectations, and political claims that  compromised their analytical 
utility. While Mill regarded nationality as positively related to the 
contemporary democratic struggles, conservatives of his day, like Lord 
Acton, feared the implications of claims to political recognition based on 
ethnicity and culture. In the classical Marxist tradition class was considered 
to be a historically more durable formation than nationality, and certainly 
capable of exploding its pretension to greater weight in his@rical change. 
For socialists and . - nationalists the very esjstegce &I of a c ~ n ~ c i o u s  class , - or 
national constituency provided both legitimacy for their political projects 
and an instrument to achieve them. 
Ever since Stalin's early pronouncements as Commissar of 
Nationalities the Soviet justifications for "gathering" the non-Russian 
peoples into a new federal state have been based on the priority of the 
claims of class (proletarian; here read Russia) over nationality (identified 
with the bourgeoisie, the peasantry or simply the ethnic; here read the 
peoples of the periphery). Separatism, it  was said, a t  best reflected the 
interests of bourgeois parties, a t  worst the false consciousness of people 
misled by Western imperialists. In stark contrast Western analysts, by 
playing down social and class characteristics and emphasizing (or even 
exclusively focusing on) political and ideological aspects of nationalist 
movements, have argued, sometimes explicitly, for the validity of the 
nationalist claim that only separation from Russia and the creation of 
independent nation-states could have satisfied their real aspirations. From 
these starkly contrasting perspectives the revolution of 1917 and the 
subsequent civil war have been interpreted by some as a national war of 
Russians against minorities, the center against the peripheries, and by 
others as a civil war of class against class, worker against peasant and 
bourgeois, city against country. A surprising number of the standard 
treatments, however, have noted the complex interplay of social and ethnic 
features. In his now-classic study of nationalism in the revolutionary years, 
a work sympathetic to the aspirations of the nationalists and repelled by the 
opportunism and centralism of the Bolsheviks, Richard Pipes repeatedly 
demonstrates that social environment -- the isolation or the nationalists 
from urban society and the working class, and their dependency on and 
difficulties in mobilizing the peasantry -- confounded the plans of the 
Ukrainian ethnic parties. l 
I11 the revolution and civil war both Marxists and nationalists used 
their own rhetoric to define the context and the players, to win followers, 
and legitimize the use of violence. The languages in which their conflicting 
ideals were expressed had their origins in antagonistic movements in the 
past century, but in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century 
Marxist and nationalist concepts had become among the most potent means 
of expressing political meaning and understanding. Their respective utopias 
were quite different, even mutually exclusive, though the ultimate 
Bolshevik compromise would afford a reluctant recognition of ethnic political 
units within a federal structure as necessary to hold the new state together. 
During the First World War a new awareness of the importance of 
nationality and the need to accomodate the nationalism of small peoples had 
taken hold both of the leaders of the Entente Powers, most particularly 
Woodrow Wilson, and of their opponents among the militant Left. 
Propaganda about peoples oppressed by the Central Powers -- Belgians, 
Alsatians, Poles, Eastern Slavs, Armenians, Kurds, and Arabs -- raised the 
question of national rights to a new level of popular consciousness. The 
Fourteen Points, as well as the socialist slogan, "The Right to Self- 
Determination of Nations," provided hope for Armenian victims of genocide, 
Polish, Czech, and Finnish aspirants to statehood, and dozens of other 
nationalities that stood to benefit from the breakup of the great empires of 
Central and Eastern Europe. At the same 'time the overthrow of tsarism 
and the consequent emergence of socialists a t  the head of the denlokratiia in 
Russia gave the language of Marxist class analysis a 'power and resonance 
that  it had never before enjoyed. For non-Russians the conflicting loyalties 
to ones social peers and ethnic compatriots presented challenging and 
changing choices. 
There are a t  least three ways in which the extreme dicotomy between 
the exclusive claims of nationality and the priority of class should be 
questioned. Firstly, as many writers have pointed out, in Eastern Europe 
and the Russian Empire class and nationality were complexly related. i n  
my own work I have emphasized how ethnicity has both reinforced and 
undermined class. In central Transcaucasia Georgian nobles and peasants, 
sharing a common ethnic culture and values based on rural, pre-capitalist 
traditions, faced an entrepreneurial Armenian urban iniddle class that 
dominated their historic capital, Tiflis, and had developed a way of life alien 
to the villagers. To the east, in and around Baku, the peasantry was almost 
entirely Azerbaijani, and urban society was stratified roughly.along ethnic 
and religious lines, with Muslim workers at the bottom, Armenian and 
Russian workers in the more skilled positions, and Christian and European 
industrialists and capitalists dominating the oil industry.2 At the same 
time the vertical ethnic ties that linked different social strata or classes 
together in a single community worked against the horizontal links between 
members of the same social class. 
Nationality reinforced class, but at the same time 
national loyalties cut across class lines. A poor unskilled 
Moslem worker had little in common with a skilled 
Armenian worker apart from their memories of the 
massacres of 1905, whereas he had the bonds of religion 
and custom tying him to a Moslem peasant and, indeed, 
to a Moslem capitalist. Moslem workers occupied the 
bottom of the labor hierarchy while at the same time 
Moslem industrialists experienced condesce sion from 
Armenian, Russian, and foreign capitalists. 9 
A second reason for softening the distance between class and 
nationality is that the intensity with which commitment to either was felt 
was related to the nature, depth, and ferocity of the social and political 
conflicts of the time. In the context of the Russian Empire, a t  least, the 
sense of ethnic oppression or superiority, and aspirations to national 
recognition were reinforced by social status and the unequal relationship 
between the particular ethnicity and. the dominant Russian nationality. The 
tsarist state promoted some peoples a t  some times (the Baltic Germans, the 
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Armenian merchants until the 1880s) and discriminated against others 
(Jews, Ukrainians, Poles particularly after 1863, Armenians after 1885, 
Finns a t  the turn of the century). After 1881 the ruling nationality, the 
Russians, increasingly conceived of social problems in ethnic terms and saw 
Jewish conspiracies, Armenian separatists, and nationalists in general as  
sources of disruption and rebellion. Such enmity and discrimination directed 
against whole peoples, regardless of social status, helped develop support for 
the conceptions of the nationalists, but a t  the same time the economic 
developmental policies of tsarism attracted certain national bourgeoisies to 
try to work with the Russifying regime. 
The development of ethnic cohesion and national awareness -- not to 
mention political nationalism -- occurred at different rates for different 
ethnicities, and this process was connected to the effects on various peoples 
of the great socio-economic transformation that took place in Russia in the 
decades preceding the revolution. Peasant peoples with little representation 
in towns (e.g., Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) experienced these 
changes differently from those ethnicities that had already developed a 
working class (Georgians, Latvians, Estonians, Jews, and to an extent, 
Armenians) and therefore participated more directly in the coming of 
capitalism. As the seigneurial economy gave way to market relations and 
new forms of the exploitation of labor replaced more tradition-sanctioned 
and paternalistic ones, it is not surprising that the mobilization of the latter 
peoples for socialist movements was much easier than of the former. 
The third reason for questioning the class/nationality dicotomy follows 
from the second. Both formations are not only socially as well as 
intellectually determined but are products of real history, not simply 
dictated by disembodied social forces or eternal essences. Class can 
. . 
"happen" or not happen, can be made and unmade, and the same is true for 
nationality. Similarly the particular conjunctures that create mobilized 
classes or nationalities, class consciousness or political nationalism, are often 
fleeting (one remembers Lenin's desperate plea to his comrades when they 
failed to appreciate the fragility of the workers'and soldiers' militance in 
October 1917 and take action: "History will not forgive us"). In 1917 
hopes for a constitutional solution to the problem of multinationality 
moderated the demands of the nationalists, and social concerns were far 
more widely articulated than ethnic ones. But after the October Revolution, 
the domestic armed opposition to Bolshevism and the intervention of foreign 
armies abruptly launched a more vociferous nationalism among many non- 
Russian peoples. In part this was due to the spread of the revolution 
outside urban centers into the countryside where the non-Russian majorities 
lived. Lines of conflict were drawn up that emphasized ethnicity (Russian 
workers against Ukrainian peasants, Armenian bourgeois against Georgian 
workers and peasants). In part it was the product of the hostility felt by 
nationalist intellectuals to the ostensibly internationalist, but evidently 
Russocentric Bolsheviks; and in part it  was a phenomenon encouraged and 
financed by the interventionists. In any case the rise of nationalism in the 
Russian Civil War was no more the natural outcome of an  inevitable 
historical process, the inherent and organic working out of the "natural" 
aspirations of the minorities, than was the rise of articulate and conscious 
class formations during.the first year of revolution. Both the development 
of class consciousness in the cities in 1917 and the subsequent spread of 
nationalism beyond the intelligentsia were phenomena to be explained both 
by long-term social, cultural, and intellectual processes that began in the 
past century and by more immediate experiences of the revolutionary years. 
Though the historical and theoretical literature on nationality and 
class goes in many directions, a significant number of works suggest similar 
conclusions about the emergence of these formations. Marxist writers in 
particular, though hardly exclusively, make the point that neither class nor 
nationality are fixed categories inherent in social relations or certain periods 
of history. Rather, to paraphrase E. P. Thompson on class, they happen 
when people, "as a result of common experiences (inherited and shared), feel 
and articulate the identity of their interests as  between themselves, and as 
against otherrs]. . . whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) 
theirs."l As part of that common experience people find themselves in 
historically-created productive relations or enter them voluntarily, and those 
relations make up the context and much of the content of their social 
experience that may create a sense of class loyalty. Thompson again: 
"Class-consciousness is-the way in which these experiences are handled in 
cultural terms: eknbodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and 
institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class 
consciousne~s does not. "5 
Given the problem we are analyzing, it must already be apparent 
that Thompson's "ethnographic" and cultural notion of class fits neatly into 
a discussion of nationality. Like a Thompsonian class, a nationality has 
been seen to be the product of "common experiences," and the articulation 
of common, shared interests, on the one hand, and opposition to others who 
do not share them. For Karl W. Deutsch, one of the most influential 
theorists of nationality, the "making" of nationality is an historical process 
of political integration that increases communication among the members of 
1 ompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: 
$it&PGfkncz. 1963). DD. 9-10 
5. Ibid. 
an ethnic group or a "people." A people, "a group of persons linked ... by 
complementary habits and facilities of communication," has the ability "to 
communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with 
members of one large group than with ~ u t s i d e r s . " ~  Deutsch links the 
increase of social communication that is basic to the formation of nationality 
to other processes of social change -- urbanization, development of markets, 
railroads and other forms of communication. A progression is made from a 
"people" to a "nationality" ("a people pressing to acquire a measure of 
effective control over the behavior of its members. .. ., striving to equip itself 
with power") and eventually (though not necessarily) to a "nation-state." 
Theorists and historians of class, like Thompson, Eric J. Hobsbawm, 
Ira Katznelson, William H. Sewell, Jr., Gareth Stedman-Jones, and others, 
as well as those of nationality (Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gellner, Geoff 
Eley, and Hobsbawm again), have also stressed that these social and 
cultural processes cannot be conceived simply a s  objective forces existing 
outside the given class or nationality but rather are mediated and shaped by 
the social and cultural (even linguistic) experience of individuals and groups 
within the social group. Class and nationality make themselves as  much as 
they are made; that  is to say, the active work of individuals, parties, 
newspapers, and activist intellectuals are key to the creation of social and 
national consciousness. Class and national traditions are invented and 
reinvented, discarded and revived; their rhetoric, symbols, and rituals are 
borrowed, refined, and passed down by intellectuals and activists. Thus, not 
only nationalism but the formation of nationality has a history, one that  can 
be empirically elaborated and placed in time. Like other social and cultural 
6 .  Ka-onalism and Social Communication. An In uir 
into the F o u n d a t i o n s ~ a t i o n a l i t y  (New &
1953), p. 'i0-71. 
relationships, nationality has a reality in the social world and is not merely 
the liberation of an a priori volkgeist, the realization of a timeless essence. 
I t  is here that the work of the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch is 
particularly revealing. Hroch argues that  the nationalist movements he has 
studied, largely those of smaller East European peoples, grew through three 
stages: Phase A: when a small number of scholars first demonstrated "a 
passionate concern.. . for the study of the language, the culture, the history 
of the oppressed nationality;" Phase B: "the fermentation-process of 
national consciousness," during which a larger number of patriotic agitators 
diffused national ideas; and finally Phase C: the full national revival when 
the broad masses have been swept up into the nationalist moven~en t .~  
The social historical study of nationalist movements is in its infancy, 
and the bulk of the research on such movements in the Russian Empire has 
remained almost exclusively concentrated on the intellectual and political 
leaders and institutions of the non-Russian peoples. As a result there is 
little sense of the different stages of development of different national 
movements and a regretable tendency to compress the experience of the 
whole nationality into that of the patriotic intelligentsia as if the two were 
identical. Like the ambitions and actions of workers, which have often been 
collapsed into those of trade unionists and socialists, so the actions of ethnic 
masses have been equated or confused with the activities of their leaders, 
> iroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A 
boEoarative Analvsis of' the Social Comoosition of Patriotic Orouos amone 
A ., - 
the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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m85), pp. 22-23. See also his earlier work, Die Vorkampfer der nationalen 
Bewemng: bei den kleinen Volkern Eurooas Wrame. 1968). As Elev ~ o i n t s  
out iianuimportant essay, Hroch "pione6rs a socyal-historical approich to 
the study of nationalist movements and their uneven penetration. In some 
ways it amounts to a much-needed specification of Deutsch's theory of social 
communications through the kind of concrete historical investigation that 
Deutsch himself never ,really engaged in." [Geoff Eley, "Nationalism and 
Social History," Social History, VI 1 (January 198 I), p. 10 1 .] 
the writings of their intellectuals, or the votes of bodies that  claim to 
represent them virtually. Not only must be the actual sociology of 
nationalism be more carefully examined, but in order to understand the 
varieties of national movements and the varying stages of development, the 
very concept nationality must be decomposed into its various meanings. In 
a thoughtful and lucid introduction to a collection of essays on working-class 
formation, political scientist Ira Katznelson has argued that  "as a term 
'class' has been used too often in a congested way, encompassing meanings 
and questions that badly need to be distinguished from each other," and he 
suggests "that class in capitalist societies be thought of as a concept with 
four connected layers of theory and history: those of structure, ways of life, 
dispositions, and collective a ~ t i o n . " ~  This useful decomposition of the term 
"class" is equally valuable for the 'discussion of nationality. In examining 
class structure Katznelson is careful to note that along with general 
charactei-istics of capitalism, the specific national history of capitalism must 
be considered, each with their distinct "family patterns, demography, 
cultural traditions, inherited practices, state organization and policies, 
geopolitics, and other factors [that] help determine the specific empirical 
contours of macroscopic economic development a t  this first level of c l a ~ s . " ~  
Ways of life and dispositions are, of course, culturally specific, and are 
central to the analysis of both class and nationality. And finally for some 
nationalities at some times, though not necessarily for all, a specific 
conjuncture of circumstances and attitudes will lead to collective action, to 
the mobilization of part or all of the nationality in the nationalist 
movement. 
All of this is not meant to suggest that class and nationality are in all 
aspects the same kind of formation, only that in their generation and 
evolution there are striking similarities and useful comparative points. 
Class, at least in the Marxist tradition, is both the product of and an 
integral part of productive relations; nationality, i t  is usually argued, arises 
on the basis of common culture, language, geography, and historical 
experience. The weight given to these various imputs will probably differ in 
the history of these two formations. But even here i t  is striking how similar 
are the factors that strengthen the horizontal ties between class members 
and the vertical ties between ethnic compatriots. If one accepts the 
argument that  many ethnicities share the boundaries of a social class, as in 
Eastern Europe and Russia, then productive relations also play a part in the 
making of nationality and nationalism. If one believes that  class is made 
historically in a cultural process, then coinmon or different languages, ethnic 
ties or divisions, and social geography will have profound effects on class 
cohesion or fragmentation, consciousness, and the ability (or inability) to act 
collectively. 
When the formation of class and nationality is understood to be a 
contingent and historically-determined occurance rather than an essential 
working out of a natural or historical logic, one must also discard the 
comfortable notion (for socialists) that a militant revolutionary class 
conscious working class was the natural outcome of labor's history, as well, 
as the equally dearly held conviction (of nationalists and their supporters) 
that  nationalism leading to the goal of an independent, sovereign nation- 
state was the natural and inevitable outcome of the national struggle. 
2. The National Movements in the Russian Empire in 1917 
Though most scholars of Russia and the Soviet Union write either 
exclusively about ethnic Russia or one of the non-Russian peoples, sharply 
separating the history of the two, the approach adopted here attempts t o  
reintegrate the history of the non-Russian peoples into the history of the 
whole empire. The modest hope of the author is that in the future more of 
his colleagues will adopt such a perspective and understand Russia and the 
Soviet Union in its multi-national dimensions rather than as ethnic Russia 
writ large or a series of discrete ethnic histories. 
Even the most cursory look at the revolution in the central Russian 
cities reveals the depth and intensity of the struggle between social 
classes. lo Less apparent a t  first, but equally compelling after emmersion in 
the monographic literature, is the revelation of social conflict of very great 
intensity in the national borderlands, obscured at times by the ethnic 
coloration but in fact made all the more ferocious by cultural as well as class 
cleavages. Here the social and the ethnic are so closely intertwined that 
separation of the two can be artificial and misleading. One gigantic social 
upheaval engulfed the whole of the Russian Empire in the third year of the 
World \Tar, bringing down the unifying imperial authority and launching a 
prolonged crisis of authority that continued well into the Civil War years. 
For that whole period an  ever-widening economic disintegration shredded 
the social fabric of the old order. Everyone everywhere was affected, and 
physical survival became the 'first requirement for millions of people. In 
this great turmoil various regions, some of them ethnically distinct, had 
their own particular experiences, but rather than dozens of separate 
10. For a review of Western writing on 191 7 in Russia proper that 
emphasizes the importance of deep social polarization as  an explanation for 
Bolshevik victory, see Ronald Grigor Suny, "Toward a Social History of the 
October Revolution," American Historical Review, LXXXVIII, 1 (February 
1983), pp. 31-52. 
national histories they were part of the general experience fatally linked to 
the whole history of Russia. The sundering of political and economic links 
opened the way for some parts of the empire, like Finland and Poland, to 
opt for a viable independence (though not without dissenters and, in the 
case of Finland, a bloody civil war); other parts were simply set adrift. 
Because fifty or sixty years later, after decades of Soviet or independent 
development, many of the incipient nations of 1917 had firmly established 
national-cultural identities, state structures, and even manifestations of 
political nationalism, in retrospective histories the revolutionary years are 
viewed as if that future had already existed in 1917. Much of the story of 
nationbuilding, and even nationality formation, for many peoples of the 
Russian empire belongs more appropriately in the post-revolutionary period 
than in the years before the Civil War. 
The story of national formation and nationalism in the revolutionary 
years is seen here as part of the intricate mosaic of the Russian Civil War 
with social and ethnic conflicts inextricably mixed. The Civil War in the 
disintegrating Russian Empire was a civil war everywhere, right up to its 
pre-N'orld War I borders, and though in the national peripheries it  took on 
aspects of national wars, the social struggle between workers and peasants, 
tsentsovoe obshchestvo and demokratiia, city and countryside remained 
determinant. This perspective of a single, gigantic revolutionary process 
engulfing the whole of the now-defunct empire is close to the view of many 
Bolsheviks and other Russian socialist and non-socialist parties during the  
revolution and Civil War. On the other hand, nationalist parties, and most 
Western historians (E. H. Carr and Pipes most particularly), have viewed 
the experiences of the borderlands as unique events, in many ways fulfilling 
a particularly national historical evolution. And their example is followed 
by most of the monographic studies of individual nationalities. 
From the Civil War perspective Soviet power or Bolshevism never 
simply meantlRussia, and the extension of its power was not simply a 
Russian conquest of other peoples. Bolshevism, for better or worst, was the 
actual achievement of the revolution of the demokratiia as  i t  stood after 
October 1917, and Russian and Russified Ukrainian workers in Kiev and 
Kharkov, Russian and Armenians in Baku, and Russians and Latvians in 
Riga supported local soviet power (and even Bolshevism) as the preferred 
alternative to a national independence promoted by a small nationalist elite 
in the name of a peasant majority. The difficult choice placed before both 
the Russians and the non-Russian peoples was whether to support the 
central Soviet government and the revolution as now defined by it, or accept 
a precarious existence in alliance with undependable allies from abroad with 
their own self-aggrandizing agendas. In making that choice social structure, 
experience, and concerns were often much more determinate than ethnic 
considerations. 
Almost everywhere the nationalist movements were either 
strengthened or fatally weakened by the nature of their class base. Because 
ethnic solidarity, activism, Russophia or Russophobia were very often 
primed by social discontents, where nationalist leaderships were able to 
combine social reform with their program of self-definition, autonomy, or 
independence, their changes of success were increased. Where social, 
particularly agrarian reform, was delayed or neglected, ethnic political 
aspirations alone did not prove strong enough to  sustain nationalist 
intellectuals in power. For those ethnic leaders facing a peasant majority 
indifferent to their claims to power and rivaled by the Bolsheviks an  appeal 
to the Great Powers of Central and Western Europe became the last resort. 
And the intervention of foreigners, particularly the Germans in the crucial 
first months after the October Revolution, radically distorted the 
developmental lines of the first revolutionary year. This point has been 
made by Geoff Eley: 
By interposing itself between the peoples of the 
Russian Empire and their practical rights of self- 
determination a t  a crucial moment of revolutionary 
political rupture -- after the old order had collapsed, but 
while the new was still struggling to be born (to adapt a 
saying of Gramsci) -- the German military 
administration suspended the process of democratic 
experimentation before i t  had hardly begun. The 
Germans' essentially destructive impact explains some of 
the difficulty experienced by the competing political 
leaderships in the western borderlands of Russia during 
1918-20 in creating a lasting relationship to a large 
enough coalition of social support. The various political 
forces -- Bolshevik, left-nationalist, autonomist, 
separatist, counter-revolutionary -- operated more or less 
in a political vacuum in a fragile and indeterminate 
relationship to the local population;" not just because the 
Belorussian and Ukrainian societies were so 'backward' 
(the esplanation normally given), but because the 
cumulative effects of war, Imperial collapse, and German 
occupation had radically dislocated existing social 
organization, strengthening old ant  onisms between 
groups and inaugurating new ones. 
While most of the non-Russian peoples of the tsarist empire were 
overwhelmingly peasant, they differed radically one from another in the 
degree of national consciousness. At one extreme "the Belorussians were 
predominatly a peasant people hardly touched by the consciousness of a 
unique national identity. The political cause of Belorussian nationalism 
commanded the barest following.. . .Socialism and assimilation into the 
Russian nation vied with Belorussiall nationalism for the loyalties of the 
11. Geoff' Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval, and 
State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923," paper presented to the 
h4cMaster Conference on 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical 
Perspective," October 19, 1983, p. 4. 
Belorussian people. "I2 The towns and cities of the region were dominated 
by Russians, Poles, and most importantly Jews. In 1897 Belorussian- 
speakers made up only 9% of the inhabitants of Minsk, the city that 
eventually would be selected as the capital of the Belorussian Soviet 
Republic. Over 5 1% were Yiddish-speakers, 25.5% Russian, and 11.4% 
Polish. With less than 2% of Belorussian speakers living in towns over 
2,000 inhabitants and very low literacy rates, the Belorussians had only the 
smallest of nationalist elites to define and propogate their cause. National 
awareness came late and did not take hold among the peasants before the 
revolution. Socialism or assimilation were far more powerful contenders for 
Belorussian loyalties than nationalism, and the nationalist "movement," if i t  
can be called that, was almost always "a pawn in the larger schemes of the 
German military, Polish nationalists, and Russian revolutionists. ~ ~ 1 3  
Without a mass base, it remained locked into Hroch's Phase B until well 
after the establishment of Soviet power. l4 
Like the Belorussians, their neighbors, the Lithuanians had come to 
nationalism late and had barely moved into Phase C. Without an urban 
presence to speak of, nationalist sentiments did not reach much beyond the 
intelligentsia and the large Lithuanian diaspora. The creation of a 
12. Steven L. Guthier, T h e  Belorussians: National Identification and 
Assimilation, 1897- 1970," Soviet Studies XXIX, 1 (January 1977), pp. 37, 
39. 
13. Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
14. Nicholas Vakar in his study of Belorussian nationhood writes: "It 
has been said that nationhood came to the Belorussians as an almost 
unsblicited gift of the Russian Revolution. I t  was, in fact, received from the 
hands of the Austro-German Occupation Army authorities and depended on 
their good will. The Belorussian National Republic held no general election, 
and the self-appointed administration lacked the elements necessary for 
international recognition. I t  may have been well-meaning, but it had 
neither the power nor the time to make reforms effective. Furthermore, its 
subservience to the Central Powers alienated many loyal elements in the 
population." [Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia, The Making of a Nation: A 
Case Study (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 105.1 
Lithuanian National Council, the Taryba, in September 1917 and the 
declaration of independence in December were both carried out under 
German supervision. As in many other regions in the Western borderlands, 
rather' than a broad-based and coherent nationalist movement realizing 
long-held aspirations to nationhood, the creation of independent Lithuania 
was the artificial result of German politics and the immediate weakness of 
the central Russian state. Here "nationality" was the instrument that  a 
Great Power used for its own end of destroying the Russian empire and 
creating mini-states it  could control, as elsewhere and at other times "class" 
would be the basis on which the Soviets would reconstruct a multinational 
state. 
In Ukraine, scholars agree, "to an unusual degree, nationality 
coincided with economic class. Ukrainians we&, with the exception of a 
small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials 
were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely 
~ewish .  " l "Class and ethnic cleavages were closely related.. . . Russians 
manned the oppressive bureaucracy and were heavily represented among 
the principal landowners. Poles dominated the pomeshchiki class in the 
right bank provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia. Petty trade, 
commerce, and much of industry on the right bank were controlled by Jews 
who were therefore the peasantry's most visible creditors. As a 
consequence, the ethnic and socioeconomic grievances of the Ukrainian 
peasant proved mutually reinforcing and provided the foundation for a 
15. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 10. 
political movement which combined nationalism with a populist social 
program. 11 16 
Ukrainian peasants were very active in 1905-1907, though the 
movement in the first revolution had only very superficially nationalistic 
characteristics. Largely a protest over land shortages, which were blamed 
on the large holdings by noble landlords (most of them Polish and Russian), 
social discontent led to violence, but with minimal ethnic expression. Even 
the supposedly traditional Ukrainian anti-Semitism was largely absent, and 
Jewish revolutionaries were welcomed as supporters of the peasant 
movement. Peasant grievances were sufficient to generate protests without 
consistent intervention from outsiders, though on the Right Bank Spilka 
(the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union) and on the Left Bank the SRs and 
the Peasants' Union were active. l 
Historians differ in their evaluation of Ukrainian nationalism in 
1917-1918. Without question an articulate and active nationalist elite, 
made up of middle-class professionals, was prepared to confront both the 
Provisional Government and the Sovnarkoin with its demand for autonomy 
16. Steven L. Guthier, 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 
1917," Slavic Review, XXXVIII, 1 (March 1979), p. 32. In 1897 
Ukrainians made up only 35% of the population in the 113 towns in 
Ukraine; the larger the town the smaller the Ukrainian proportion. In Kiev 
Ukrainians made up 22%, Russians 54%, Jews 12%, and Poles 7%; in 
Kharkiv Ukrainians were 26%, Russians 53%, Jews 6%, and Poles 0.3%. 
[Steven L. Guthier, "Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the 
Interwar Era," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky (ed.), Rethinking Ukrainian History 
(Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of' Alberta, 
1981), p. 157; Patricia Herlihy, "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth 
Century," ibid., p. 1511 
17. For a recent treatment of the peasant movement in Right Bank Ukraine 
(Kiev, Poldolia, and Volhvnia ~rovinces). see Robert Edelman. Proletarian 
peasants:   he'   evolution of i905 in ~uss ia ' s  Southwest (lthaca: Cornell 
'University Press, 198'0. 
and self-rule.18 John Reshetar, the author of the first major scholarly 
monograph on the Ukrainian Revolution, writes: 
Inimediately after the March Revolution, 
leadership in the Ukrainian national movement was 
assumed by the democratically inclined petite 
bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia with nationalist 
sympathies, and the middle strata of the peasantry 
which supported the cooperative movement. The 
peasant masses, the soliders, and the urban proletariat 
were not participants a t  this early period, and i t  cannot 
be said that the national movement permeated their 
ranks to any significant extent in the months that 
followed since it was c mpeting with more urgent social 
and economic issues. 18 
The Rada was committed to a democratic solution to the political 
crisis, t o  remaining within a federated Russian state, ai* to a radical 
program of land reform. Its support in the cities was minimal -- in the 
elections in July to the municipal duma in Kiev Ukrainian parties won only 
20% of the vote while Russian .. .- parties garnered 67%- (Russian socialists, 
37%; "Russian voters," 15%; Kadets, 9%; Bolsheviks, 6%) --but it was 
backed by Ukrainian soldiers, particularly inte.r.ested in the formation of 
ethnic military units (see the resolutions of the First Ukrainian h'lilitary 
Congress in May 1917).~O 
Far more problematic, however, is the estimate of the level of 
national cohesion among Ukrainians and the degree of support for the 
national program among the peasants. For Reshetar nationalism is a 
"Most of the men who undertook the propagation of the national idea in 
g r a i n ,  were intellectuals with a middle-class background although many 
of them were of peasant stock. Hrushevsky was the son of an official in the 
Russian ministry of public instruction, and Dmitro Doroshenko was the son 
of a military veterinarian. Colonel Eugene Konovalets and Volodimir 
Naumenko were the sons of teachers. Nicholas Mikhnovsky, Volodimir 
Chekhovsky, Valentine Sadovsky, Serhi Efremov, and Colonel Peter 
Bolbochan were the sons of priests." [John Reshetar, The Ukrainian 
Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton 
Universitv Press. 1952). DD. 320-3211 
20. ~ i ~ e s , ' ~ h e  Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 63; Reshetar, - The 
Ukrainian Itevolution, pp. 50-5 1, 102n- 103n. 
middle-class movement and the peasant "was enslaved by his locale and 
regarded the inhabitants of the neighboring villages as a species of 
foreigner." The absence of a Ukrainian bourgeoisie of any weight and the 
"essentially agrarian character of late nineteenth century Ukrainian society, 
with its emphasis on the locale, tended to retard the development of that 
sentiment of group cohesiveness which transcends localism and is termed 
national consciousness. The peasant, because of his conservatism, was able 
to retain his language, peculiarites of dress, and local customs despite 
foreign rule, but initially he resisted the notion that all Ukrainians, whether 
living in Kharkiv province, in Volynia, or in Carpatho-Ukraine, belonged to 
the same nation." Though this peasant parochialism was partially broken 
down by the spread of currency, the building of railroads, and the 
dissemination of newspapers and periodicals, the protracted process of 
nationality formation "had not been consummated as late as 1917." 
Reshetar points out that  even in 1917 peasants in Ukraine referred to 
themselves not as  a single collective but with regional terms: Rusiny (sons 
of Rus), Galicians, Bukovinians, Uhro-rusins, Lenki, and Hutsuli. 
Russophilia was still strong in many parts of the country, even among the 
peasantry, and much of the middle-class and working class was ~ u s s i f i e d . ~ ~  
Richard Pipes agrees with Reshetar that "the weakest feature of the 
Ukrainian national movement was its dependence on the politically 
disorganized, ineffective, and unreliable village," but he emphasizes their 
"political immaturity, which made them easily swayed by propaganda, 
and.. . their strong inclinations toward anarchism. " Nevertheless, 
nationalism was a reality in Ukraine, "a political expression of genuine 
interests and loyalties," which had its roots in "a specific Ukrainian culture, 
21. Heshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, pp. 319-323. 
- 
resting on peculiarities of language and folklore; a historic tradition dating 
from the seventeenth-century Cossack communities; an identity of interests 
among the members of the large and powerful group of well-to-do peasants 
of the Dnieper region; and a numerically small but active group of 
nationally conscious intellectuals, with a century-old heritage of cultural 
nationalism behind them." But "the fate of the Ukraine, as of the 
remainder of the Empire, was decided in the towns, where the population 
was almost entirely Russian in its culture, and hostile to Ukrainian 
nationalism. "22 Contingent factors such as the inexperience of the national 
leaders and the shortage of administrative personnel are mentioned as  part 
of the toxic mix that destroyed the Ukrainian experiment in independence. 
While one might hesitate to accept Reshetar's firm requirement that 
a middle class must exist for a nationalist movement to succeed or Pipes' 
assumption that  there was a conscious community of interests between 
intelligentsia and peasantry in 19 17, the argument that .the movement 
would stand or fall on the backs of the peasantry seems compelling. In a 
most intriguing article Steven L. Guthier argues, in contrast to Reshetar, 
that the Ukrainian peasantry was nationally coilscious in 1917, as 
demonstrated in their choices in the November elections to the Constituent 
Assembly when they overwhelmingly supported Ukrainian parties. In the 
eight Ukrainian provinces (Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia, Ekaterinoslav, 
Chernigov, Kherson, and Kharkov) "55 percent of all votes cast outside the 
Ukraine's ten largest cities went to lists dominated by the UPSR [Ukrainian 
Party of Socialist Revolutionaries] and Selians'ka Spilka [All-Ukrainian 
Peasants' Union]; another 16 percent went to Left PSWUPSR slates. 1123 
The cities, on the other hand, went for Russian and Jewish parties, though 
22. Pipes, 'l'he 'ormation of the Soviet Union, p. 149. 
23. Guthier, "'l'he Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917," p. 40. 
heavy turnouts among Ukrainian soldiers gave substantial backing to 
Ukrainian parties. 
Guthier concludes that  "Ukrainian nationalism as  a substantial 
political force was a one-class movement," but one in which identification 
between peasant aspirations and the programs of the national parties was 
quite close.24 He assumes that  peasants voting for the Ukrainian peasant 
parties were aware of and accepted the national planks in their programs. 
"The peasants were committed to the creation of a Ukraine which was both 
autonomous and socialist. They wanted land rights to be reserved for those 
who farmed the land with their own hands." 
A useful distinction, however, might be made between cultural or 
ethnic awareness and full-blown political nationalism, i.e., an active 
commitment to realizing a national agenda. While the election results show 
that peasants in Ukraine preferred parties and leaders of their own 
ethnicity, people who could speak to them in their own language and 
promised to secure their local interests, they do not provide sufficient 
evidence either that the peasantry conceived of itself as a single nationality 
or that it could be effectively mobilized to defend ideals of national 
autonomy or independence. Though more work is needed to determine the 
mentality of the Ukrainian peasants of 1917, an in~pression is left that  they 
had some ethnic awareness, preferring their own kind to strangers, but 
were not yet moved by a passion for the nation and certainly not willing to 
sacrifice their lives for anything beyond the village. For defeated 
nationalists, as  well as "class-conscious" Bolsheviks, the peasants of Ukraine 
were considered "backward," "unconscious," unable to be mobilized except 
for the most destructive, anarchistic ends. But more generously one might 
argue that  rather than backward, Ukrainian peasants had their own 
localistic agenda in the chaos of the Civil War, one that did not mesh neatly 
either with that  of urban inteilectuals, nationalist or Bolshevik, or with 
workers, many of whom despised those living in the village. 
Guthier may be closer to the mark when he sees the momentary 
coincidence of peasant voters and Ukrainian populists as the specific 
conjuncture when "national autonomy was seen as the best guarantee that 
the socioeconomic reconstruction of the Ukraine would reflect local, not all- 
Russian  condition^."^^ Here once again both the contingent and evolving 
character of nationalism (and class, for that matter) and the closeness of 
ethnic and social factors become clear. At least in 19 17-19 15 the Ukrainian 
peasants were most concerned about the agrarian question and their own 
suffering in the years of war and scarcity.26 They thought of tliemselves 'as 
peasants, which for them was the same as being "Ukizainiali" (or whatbver 
they might have called themselves locally). Their principal hope was for 
agrarian reform and the end of the oppression identified with the' state and- 
the city. Russians, Jews, and Poles were the sources of that oppression, and 
i t  is conceivable that for inany peasants the promise of autonomy was seen 
as  the means to achieving the end to their condescension and arbitrary 
power. But ethnic claims had no priority over social ones in these early 
. . 
years of revolution, and alliances with nationalists (or more frequently, 
25. lbld., p. 41. 
26. "The Central Rada and the Directory failed to' solve the agricultural 
problem; the hetman government did worse. I t  was constantly a step 
behind the revolutionary spirit of the peasants. its policy was to carry out 
t h e  land reform legally for approval by a future Constituent Assembly. For 
this reason i t  was not able to compete with the Bolsheviks, who were 
promising the land to the peasants immediately, or even with Makhno, who 
was giving the land to the peasants as soon as i t  was captured. For the 
peasants, the land was a primary question and those forces that would not 
interfere in the division of land would get their support." [Michael Palij, The -
Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1920: An Aspect of the Ukrainian 
Revolution (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 19'/6), pp. 54-55.] 
ethnic populists) could easily be replaced by marriages of convenience with 
27 more radical elements. 
When the nationalist Rada was unable to resist effectively the 
Bolshevik advance in January 1918, i t  turned as a last resort to the 
Germans who requisitioned grain and terrorized peasants. When the 
nationalists failed to back up their own agrarian reform, support for the 
first generation of revolutionary nationalists among many peasants rapidly 
evaporated. As a consequence of the German occupation, the nationalist 
forces in Ukraine splintered into competing groups; the nationalist cause 
was identified by many as linked to foreign intervention; and to anti- 
nationalist elements, particularly in towns, the only viable alternative to 
social chaos, foreign dependence, and Ukrainian chauvinism appeared to be 
the Bolsheviks. A German report of March 1918 gives a sense of the 
fragmentation in Ukraine in early 1918, the uncertainly of nationalist 
influence, and the relative strength of the Bolsheviks: 
I t  is not true that  the Bolsheviks are supported 
only by the Russian soldiers who remained in the 
Ukraine .... They have a large following in the country. 
All the industrial workers are with them, as  is also a 
considerable part of the demobilized soldiers. The 
attitude of the peasants, however is very difficult to 
ascertain. The villages that have once been visited by 
27. For another point of' view on Ukrainian nationalisnl and the peasantry, 
see Andrew P. Lamis, "Some Observations on the Ukrainian National 
Movement and the Ukrainian Revolution, 19 17- 192 1, " Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies, 11, 4 (December 1978), pp. 525-53 1. Lamis argues that Ukrainian 
nationalism from Taras Shevchenko on had a dual nature: glorification of 
the homeland and a demand for social reform. Often these two components 
:remained separate and in a state of dialectical tension." (p. 528) He takes 
issue with Arthur Adams, who claimed that Ukrainian peasants revolted 
during the German occupation primarily because of the grain requisitions 
and fear for their land. Lamis contends that the jacquerie was nationalist, 
aimed at one and the same time toward national and social fi-eedom, even 
though the peasants and the intelligentsia did not act in concert. (p. 530) 
For Adams arguement, see his essay, "The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie," in 
Taras Hunczak (ed.), The Ukraine 191 7-192 1: A Study in Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 19'1'/), pp. 247- 
270. 
Bolshevik gangs ... are, as a rule, anti-Bolshevik. In other 
places Bolshevik propaganda seems to be successful 
among the peasants. 
The peasants are concerned chiefly with the 
dividing up of the land; they will follow the Rada if it  
allows them to take the estates of the landlords ... as 
proclaimed in the the Third and Fourth Universals.. .. 
Otherwise they will go with the Bolsheviks. Although 
the Bolsheviks lost out in many places because of their 
system of terror, their slogan "Take everything, all is 
yours" is too attractive and tempting to the masses. 
The Ukrainian separatist movement, on which the 
Rada is relying, has no true roots in the country and is 
supported only by a small group of political dreamers. 
The people as a whole show omplete indifference to 
national self-determination. 2% 
Sadly for the nationalists and happily for the Bolsheviks, the 
peasantry proved to be an unsteady social base for a political movement. 
When the Directory, which came to power in November 1918 and tried to 
place itself at the head of the peasant risings against the Hetmanate, 
faltered in its implementation of new programs, 
turning cautious and,conservative in order to preserve its 
very life, the forces of the Jacquerie swept past it to 
embrace another, more radical political group, which 
seemd to promise a program that would suit peasant 
tastes. Specifically, even before th-r 1918 had run 
its course, many of the Directory's peasant-Cossack 
supporters were already going over to the Bolsheviks.. . . 
For a few months in early 19 19 there was an illusi 
that the two forces had joined for a common cause. 9g 
But the Bolsheviks effectively disenfranchised the middle and wealthier 
peasantry and instituted a new round of requisitioning. Formerly 
sympathetic villagers turned against the Soviets, and the final Bolshevik 
victory depended on support from the workers, Russian and Russified, of the 
28. 'l'he r e ~ o r t  authored bv the German writer Collin Ross was first 
published $ Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, I, pp. 288-292, and translated and 
reprinted in James Hunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in 
Russia, April-December 19 18: Uocuments and Materials (Baltimore: The 
ohns Hopkins Press, , PP. 4- 
J29. Adams, "The GreA9;"kLainian ?acquerie," pp. 259-260. See also his 
Bolsheviks .in the Ukraine: The Second Campi&, 1918-1919 (New Haven: 
Pale University Press, 1963). 
cities and the Donbass and the Red Army. Here the Bolsheviks were 
stronger than any of their contenders. 
While Belorussia had never been a historic nation and Ukraine had 
first been conceived independently of Russia only in the nineteenth century, 
Georgia and Armenia had existed historically long before the first Russian 
state had been formed. The sense of a continuous existence was 
fundamental to the national self-conceptions of the Armenian and Georgian 
intelligentsias of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as they 
revived the study of national history and literature. Their struggles for 
national emancipation began as liberal and democratic movements of 
writers, journalists, and teachers, but by the last decade of the nineteenth 
century the first generations of nationalist intellectuals had been shunted 
aside by younger, more radical,  socialist^.^^ For these peoples, as for other 
small nations in Hroch's analysis, the struggle for national emancipation 
was also a struggle against the non-national or denationalized bourgeoisie. 
Though the similarities between the origins and initial stages of 
Armenian and Georgian nationalism are striking, the different social 
structures of the two nationalities and their different political imperatives 
led to quite different nationalist ideologies and political trajectories. 
Armenians were a largely peasant people divided between three great 
30. On the fbrmation of' the Armenian national intelligentsia, see the 
articles by George A. Bournoutian, Fbnald G. Suny, Sarkis Shmavonian, 
Vahe Oshagan, and Gerard J. Libaridian in Armenian Review, XXXVi, 3- 
143 (Autumn 1983); Suny, "Populism, Nationalism, and Marxism: The 
Origins of Revolutionary Parties Among the Armenians of the Caucasus," 
ibid, XXXII, 2- 126 (June 1979), pp. 134-15 1; and "h!larxism, Nationalism, 
alld the Armenian Labor Movement in Transcaucasia, 1890-1903," ibid, 
XXXIII, 1-129 (March 1980), pp. 30-47. On the Georgians, see S u n i T h e  
Emergence of Political Society in Georgia," in R. G. Suny (ed.), 
Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change (Ann Arbor: Michigan 
Slavic Publications, 1983), pp. 109-140. 
empires, the Russian, the Persian, and the Ottoman Turkish, which at the 
same time had a centuries-old diaspora that connected the educated and 
business people of the homeland with Europe, the Middle East, and even 
India. Their ancient nobility had largely been eliminated by the time of the 
Mongol occupation and the fall of the last Armenian kingdom in the late 
fourteenth century. By the early nineteenth century the leading class 
among Armenians were the merchants and petty industrialists of Tiflis, 
Baku, Istanbul, and Smyrna. Among non-Armenians the most prevalent 
image of the Armenian was of the merchant, and both in Turkey and the 
Caucasus Armenians played a highly visible role in the development of 
industry and trade. Baku oil was pioneered by Armenians, and the 
economic growth of the ancient Georgian capital, Tiflis (Tbilisi), was largely 
an Armenian enterprise. Here was dn historic nation, then, with an 
educated urban bourgeoisie, but one disconnected socially and by virtue of 
distance or intern'ational boi-ders from the heartland of its own people. 
Georgians were also a largely rural people, but without the significant 
urban presence of the Armenians. The Georgian nobility had survived the 
annexation of Georgia by the Russians and had, in fact, become part of the 
dvorianstvo. But the noble elite failed to make a successful adjustment to 
the post-Emancipation economy, and their ideal of national harmony cutting 
across classes failed to attract beyond the intelligentsia. In the 1890s 
younger Georgian intellectuals adopted a specifically Marxist world view 
that saw both the bourgeoisie (which in this case was largely Armenian) 
and the autocracy (which was Russian) as enemies of Georgian social and 
political freedom. Given the particular social composition of Georgia's 
society the social and national struggles were successfully merged under a 
Marxist leadership that claimed not to be nationalist and was willing to link 
up with all-Russian Social Democracy. For the Georgians the natural 
constituency for Social Democrats, the workers, was supplemented by 1905 
by broad support (almost unique in the Russian Empire) among the 
peasantry. By the years of the first revolution Georgian Marxist 
intellectuals found themselves a t  the head of a genuinely supra-class 
national liberation movement. The Mensheviks easily won the elections to 
the four state dumas, controlled soviets and councils in the towns and 
countryside in 191 7, and were the overwhelmingly choice of Georgians in 
the elections to the Constituent Assembly. In Georgia Hroch's Phase C had 
\ 
been achieved in the first decade of the twentieth century, but instead of a 
vertically-integrating nationalism, Georgians adopted an expressly non- 
nationalist socialist movement as  their preferred form of political expression. 
Though the absolute number of Armenians continued to grow in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and they continued to dominate 
the largest cities of the Caucasus economically and politically, Armenians 
found themselves in a precarious demographic position. The relative 
position of Armenians in the Armenian plateau of eastern Anatolia 
worsened. The in-migration of Balkan Muslims, Circassians, and the rapid 
growth of the Kurdish population combined with the out-migration of 
Armenians, particularly after the massacres of 1894-1896, made the 
Armenians even more of a minority in a heavily Turkish and Kurdish 
population. Impressed by the urgency of a political solution, the nationalist 
intelligentsia disavowed joint solutions with other parties of the Russian 
Empire. The Armenian revolutionary parties took the battle to Turkey, and 
by means of "propaganda of the deed" and examples of militant sacrifice, 
attempted to mobilize a rather passive and demoralized peasantry. Though 
there were a number of spectacular examples of "resistance" by armed 
Armenians (Zeitun, Sassun), the revolutionaries never achieved a high 
degree of mass mobilization. Their tactic was largely limited by virtue of 
their relative weakness before the Turks, first, to terrorist attacks and, 
later, to a dangerous policy of alliance with the Young Turks. The 
Armenian revolutionary nationalists, who in fact had come out of the middle 
and lower middle classes, turned their venom (and occasionally even their 
weapons) against Armenians of property who refused to contribute to the 
national cause. Wary of the revolutionaries, the Armenian bourgeoisie in 
Turkey stayed close to the national church which they largely controlled; in 
Russia they remained liberals tied to  a more reformist evolution of the 
tsarist order. Because of the self-destruction of one major party, the Social 
Democratic Hnchaks, and the relative isolation of the liberals and 
"internationalist" Social Democrats in the cities, the more nationalist of the 
socialist parties, the Dashnaktsutiun, emerge'd by the early twentieth 
century as the only-real.contender for Armenian loyalties. In 1903 i t  gained 
wide support among city dwellers and even peasants in the Caucasus as the 
principal defender of the Church, whose properties had been requisitioned 
by the tsarist government. In Hrochian terms one might claim that  in the 
years before World War I the patriots of Phase B were attempting, though 
not yet fully successfully, to enter Phase C. 
The war, however, and the subsequent genocide of Armenians in 
eastern Anatolia created an entirely new situation. Thousands of refugees 
fled to the Caucasus with retreating Russian armies, and the cities of Baku 
and Tiflis filled with Turkish Armenians. Armenian volunteer military 
units fought on the Caucasian Front, and when Russian troops "voted with 
their feet" late in 1917 and abandoned the Caucasus, Armenians found that 
they possessed one of the most powerful military forces in the region. For 
Armenians the principal source of danger came from their ethnic and 
religious enemies, the Ottoman Turks and the Azerbaijanis, and the very 
acuity of that danger completed what two decades of revolutionary 
propaganda had been working to accomplish -- the effective mobilization of 
the Caucasian Armenian population to vote for and fight for the national 
future as defined by the Dashnaktsutiun. Overwhelmingly Armenians 
voted for the Dashnaks in the elections to  the Constituent Assembly. 
Ethnic conflicts were largely subordinate to  social conflicts throughout 
the first year of revolution in Transcaucasia, but Armenians, traumatized 
by the mass killings and deportations in Turkey, maintained their separate 
national position on all major political questions. Still economic pressures 
and the question of state power, along with the issue of the war, relegated 
ethnic matters to second place. Though ethnic tensions appeared in the 
newly-elected municipal duma in Tiflis, as Georgians replaced the formerly 
hegemonic Armenian middle class, they were contained within a political 
framework that promised democratic solutions to these perennial problems. 
But the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd, their relative strength in Baku and 
weakness in Tiflis, and the removal of Russian troops from the Caucasian 
front and urban garrisons created a new political environment, one in which 
the danger of Turkish invasion threatened some nationa1itie.s (the 
Armenians) and was seen as an opportunity by others (the Azerbaijanis). 
Choices had to be made between siding with Soviet Russia, the Entente or 
the Germans, and each national leadership chose a different path. The 
central political issue became self-defense, and in the context of Russian 
retreat and Turkish-German advance it quickly took on an ethnic 
dimension. A brief experiment in Transcaucasian autonomy was followed 
by an even briefer one in a independent federative republic. By late May 
1918 the Georgians opted for the Germans rather than the Bolsheviks; the 
Azerbaijanis turned expectantly toward the Turks; the multinational city of 
Baku opted for Soviet power; and the Armenians were left to their fate.31 
The only realistic hope for an ethnic Armenian homeland in the post- 
genocide period was the small enclave around Erevan, which in May 1918 
became the center of a fragile independent republic. Armenian political 
leaders had not been anxious to attempt independence, but now they were 
forced to take control of their refugee population. They alone of the 
Transcaucasian peoples turned to the Entente for support. The ostensibly 
socialist ideo1og-y of the Dashnaktsutiun was largely neglected, and the 
party became the representative of all classes of Caucasian Armenians as 
they faced together the common threat from Ottoman and post-Ottoman 
Turks. 
Azerbaijaiiis, who long had felt victims of the ChrYstian overlords and 
bourgeoisie in Transcaucasia, welcomed the'leverage and support offered by 
their Turkish brethren. The nationalist leaders, located in Ganja 
(Elisavetpol'), entered Baku with the Ottoman Army and took their revenge 
on the local Armenians (September 1918). But there they were faced by a 
mixed population of Russian, Armenian, and Muslim workers who had 
undergone a long socialist and trade unionist education. The nationalists 
were never fully secure in the city where Bolshevism had deep roots. 
Among the peasantry on whom they depended, national consciousness was 
still embryonic. In a recent study of Azerbaijani national identity, Tadeusz 
Swietochowski writes: 
While the intelligentsia experienced an evolution 
that took i t  in quick succession from Pan-Islamism to 
3 1. 'l'he best account of' Transcaucasian politics during the revolution and 
Civil War remains Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia 
(1917- 192 1) (New York.: Philosophical Library, 195 1). 
Turkish to Azerbaijanism, the masses remained on the 
level of 'umma consciousness with its typical indifference 
to secular power, foreign or native. The idea of an 
Azerbaiiani nation-state did not take root amone the 
u - 
majority of the population; the very term nationalism 
was eigher not understood by them or, worse, i t  rang - 
with the sound of a term of abuse, a fact the 
Communists exploited in their propaganda against the 
Azerbaijani Republic. This might help explain why the 
overthrow of the republic was amazingly easy. Even 
those who subsequently rebelled against Soviet r e did 
not fight for the restoration of the fallen regime. d 
Certainly the most viable and stable state in Transcaucasia was 
Georgia. Here Social Democracy was well-grounded both in the working 
class and the peasantry. German intervention was needed, not to shore up 
the regime, but to prevent attack from outside. Ironically, the Georgian 
nation-state was formed and led by Marxists whose expectation had been of 
a democratic revolution in Russia that would have solved at one sweep the 
ethnic and social oppression experienced by their people. Instead they found 
themselves a t  the head of an  independent "bourgeois" state, the managers 
of the "democratic revolution" in one small country, called upon to fulfill the 
national program of parties far to the right of them. Unquestioizably they 
had excellent chances for success; the Mensheviks were supported by the 
great majority of the Georgian people; but the larger geopolitical and 
strategic imperatives of the central Soviet government did not permit them 
to demonstrate the potential for democratic socialism in a post-revolutionary 
state. By 1920 a powerful group within the Bolshevik party pushed for an 
uprising within Georgia to  be followed by an invasion by the Red Army. 
Lenin was initially opposed to this cynical disregard for the evident 
influence of the Georgian Social Democrats, but he backed down before the 
fait accompli engineered by Orjonikidze and Stalin. 
'I'adeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905- 1920: The Shaping 
?National Identity in a Muslim Community (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 1985), p. 193. 
The only states to remain independent after the Civil War were, of 
course, in the northwest of Russia, along the Baltic -- Poland, Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Here as well complex ethnic-class 
relationships existed. In the Baltic littoral German nobles dominated rural 
life in areas of predominantly Estonian and Latvian peasantry. Polish and 
Jewish city dwellers almost exclusively ran Vilno, which was surrounded by 
Belorussian and Lithuanian villages.33 The demographic situation in 
Tallinn (Reval) and Riga were more complex. The German bourgeoisie and 
nobles dominated local governing institutions, but the number of Estonians 
and Latvians in the towns grew rapidly until the local peoples became the 
largest nationality in their respective capitals.34 A Latvian and an 
Estonian woiking class and a small bourgeoisie had developed by the early 
tweiltieth century. In terms of social structure --'the presence of an alien 
ruling elite, 'and a wowing native working cla's6'-'- as well 2s the difficulty of 
achieving political influence under tsarism, the Latvians and Estonians were 
in a political impasse with evident similarities to t h a t  of the Georgians. 
Estonian nationalism had developed relatively late. Only in the 
1860s did the first generation of Estonian patriots free themselves of their 
33. In 1897 Vilno was 40.3% Jewish, 30.9% Polish, and only 7% 
Lithuanian; Vilno district, excluding the city, had 35% Lithuanian; the 
whole province was 56% Belorussian and 17.5% Lithuanian. [Alfred Erich 
Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania (New York: ~o lumbia  
Universitv Press. 1959). D. 421 
34. By 1913 ~ s t k i a n s ' m a d e  ip 69.2% of the urban population of Estonia; 
Russians 11.9%; and Germans, 11.2%; in Tallinn Estonians were 72%, 
though that figure declined during the war because of the influx of Russian 
and other workers to 58% by 1917. [Toivo U. Raun, Estonia and the 
Estonians (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 19871, p. 911 In Kiga 
Latvians had become a plurality by 1881, and by 1913 they made up 38.8% 
of the city's population; Russians 22.4%; Germans, 16.4%. [Anders 
Henriksson, "Riga: Growth, Conflict, and the Limitations of Good 
Government, 1850-1914," in Michael F. Harnrn (ed.), The City in Late 
Imperial Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 19861, p. 1m.I 
original German patrons who had initiated interest in Estonian folkways. 
Village schoolteacl~ers and university-educated intellectuals joined with 
peasants in forming choruses and patriotic clubs and reading the national 
press. Yet the patriotic intelligentsia faced serious difficulties as i t  tried to 
penetrate the largely peasant population. Estonians had no political past 
with which to identify, no written language, no national literature. They 
were kept out of institutions of education, religion, and politics by the ruling 
Germans. Tallinn was a German town surrounded by relatively passive 
peasants. Yet these "disintegrating factors," writes Hroch, were offset by 
"the class antagonism between the feudal German landowners and their 
Estonian subjects" which was "the fundamental and probably most decisive 
factor which from a certain date onwards stimulated the spread of national 
consciousness among broad strata of the oppressed Estonian nationality." 
Popular nationalism was further promoted in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century when Estonians entered the towns, gained higher 
education, and, ,along with the Latvians, achieved the highest level of 
literacy in the Russian Empire. "The sphere of integrating factors," Hroch 
continues, "expanded to include the antagonism between the small-scale 
Estonian con~modity-producers and the middle and upper German strata 
there."35 The tsarist campaign of Russification in the Baltic helped to 
stimulate national awareness in the broad population, among Estonians, 
Latvians, and Finns. 
The parallels between Latvia and Georgia are particularly striking. 
In both countries the older generation of national partriots (in Latvia 
"Young Latvia;" in Georgia the pirveli dasi and the meore dasi) were 
surplanted by Marxists (the Latvian "New Current" and the Georgian 
35. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National ~ev iva l ,  p. 85. 
mesame dasi). The brunt of national hostility was directed, not against the 
Russians, but against the locally dominant nationality (in Latvia, the 
Germans; in Georgia, the Armenians) and refracted through the class 
rhetoric of Social Democracy. From the first days of the revolution 
Menshevism in Georgia and Bolshevism in Latvia were the strongest local 
movements with little competition from the nationalists. 
As Andrew Ezergailis has shown in two monographs, Bolshevism had 
exceptionally strong support among Latvian and other workers and among 
the famous Latvian riflemen. In the August elections to the municipal 
council of Riga Bolsheviks won 41% of the vote (60% among ethnic 
~ a t v i a n s ) . ~ ~  A week later Bolsheviks won 63.4% of the vote to the major . 
rural institution, the Vidzeme Land Council, and in November they carried 
the elections to the Constituent Assembly in those parts o'f Latvia (Vidzeme) 
that were-not yet occupied by the Germans, winning 71.85%. Among the 
strelki Bolsheviks won 95% bf the votes.37 This extrliordinary showing 
J- . 
stems from a number of factors: the general Latvian alienation from the 
Germans and the relatively less hostile attitude toward Russians; the high 
proportion of landless peasants (more than 1,000,000 in 1897) that favored 
Social Democracy and opposed the "grey barons" (Latvian smallholders) 
almost as much as  they did the German nobles; the support of Social 
Democracy among a militant working class that  had experienced a bloody 
baptism in 1905, as well as among intellectuals, school teachers, and 
students; the particularly devastating experience of the World War, which 
had brought the fighting deep into Latvia, dividing the country, causing 
36. Andrew Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia (Boulder: East 
European Quarterly, 19'14)~ p. 'l'he Latvian impact on the Bolshevik 
Revolution, The First Phase: S:tzmber 1917 to April 1918 (Boulder: East 
guropean *onornap s. 
37. ~ z e r ~ a i l i s ,  Fhe Latvian impact, pp. 79, 87, 89. 
great hardship, and radicalizing the population; and finally the ability of the 
Bolsheviks to develop and propagate a program that at one and the same 
time attempted to deal with social and ethnic grievances.38 The solution to 
their national future, it  appeared to a great number of Latvians in 1917, 
was within a Russian federation but one which had moved beyond the 
bourgeois revolution. The brief experiment in Bolshevik rule after October, 
the Iskolat, fell before the Germans when they moved into unoccupied 
Latvia in February 1918. Bolshevism would have been the eventually 
victor in Latvia save for the German intervention which gave the 
nationalists an initial chance to create their own republic. 
The Estonians were far less radical than the Latvians, but Bolshevik 
strength grew steadily through 1917. Elections to the Maapaev (the 
provincial assembly of Estonia) (May-November 19 17) produced the 
following party alignment: 
Agrarian League 13 
Labor Party 11 
Estonian SDs (Mensheviks) 9 
Estonian SRs 8 
Democrats (Estonian) 7 
Bolsheviks 5 
Radical Democrats 4 
German and Swedish minorities 2 
Non-party 3 39 
By late July-early August, the Bolsheviks, whose greatest strength was in 
the larger industrial towns of Tallinn and Narva, polled 31% of the vote in 
municipal council elections (SRs, 22%; Estonian S D  - Russian and Latvian 
Menshevik Bloc, I ~ % ) . ~ O  Here, as  in the elections to the Tallinn soviet, 
38. For an attempt to deal with the different choices of the Estonians and 
the Latvians in 1917, see Stanley W. Page, The Formation of the Baltic 
States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence 
of' Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1959; reprint: New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), pp. 83-85. 
39. Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, p. 100. 
40. Ibid., p. 101. 
large numbers of voters were soldiers (16% in Tallinn) and non-Estonians. 
Bolsheviks did less well in Tartu and the rural areas. Still, in the 
November elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks outpolled 
the other parties (40.2%; Labor Party, 21%), though socialists as  a whole 
won just over 50% and the non- socialists nearly matched them. Bolsheviks 
won in Tallinn (47.6%), followed by the Labor Party, but the non-socialist 
Democratic Bloc won in Tartu (53.4%) and southern ~ s t o n i a . ~ ~  
After the October Revolution Bolshevized soviets ran many of the 
towns in Estonia, but support for the soviets began to erode rapidly. The 
Bolsheviks were unenthusiastic about Estonian independence, failed to 
expropriate the estates of the Baltic barons, and tried to suppress 
oppositional parties. When elections were held for the Estonian Constituent 
Assembly in late January 1918, Bolsheviks polled only 37.1% while the 
Labor Party rose to 29.8% and the Democratic Bloc held steady at 23.2%. 
The elections were incomplete, for the Bolsheviks first postponed and later 
cancelled them, and i t  appears that sentiment in the area was moving in 
favor of independence. When the Germans advanced in late February, the 
nationalists used the opportunity to declare Estonia independent of ~ u s s i a .  
3. Some Preliminary Conclusions. 
In his reflections on the factors that had led to Bolshevik victory 
Lenin a t  the end of 1919 listed three decisive conditions: an overwhelming 
majority among the proletariat; support among half of the armed forces; and 
overwhelming superiority of forces a t  the decisive moment a t  the decisive 
points, namely Petrograd, Moscow, and on the military fronts nearest the 
center. Revolutionary workers and soldiers at the right place a t  the right 
time provided the necessary and powerful "striking force" (udarnyi kulak) to 
rout their opponents and secure the Bolsheviks in power. For Lenin 
revolution was fundamentally different from a n  election campaign in which 
a simple majority resolves the ultimate question of power; for him the more 
appropriate metaphor for revolution was a military campaign. 
An overwhelming superiority of forces at the 
decisive point a t  the decisive moment -- this 'law' of 
military success is also the law of political success, 
especially in that  fierce, seething class war which is 
called revolution. 
Capitals, or, in general big commercial and 
industrial centers (here in Russia the two coincided, but 
they do not everywhere coincide), to a considerable 
degree decide the political fate of a nation, provided, of 
course, the centers are supported by suffficient local, 
rural forces, e en if that  support does not come 
immediately. 43 
After the initial winning of state power, Lenin emphasized, i t  was 
still .essential for the Bolsheviks to win over the majority of the population. 
Holding state power was a precondition for that  victory, which was achieved 
by smashing the old state apparatus, undermining the power and prestige of 
the bourgeoisie and its allies, and satisfying the economic needs of the 
exploited a t  the ertpense of the exploiters. The prolonged struggle of the 
Civil War was marked by vacillation on the part of the peasantry, first in 
favor of the Bolsheviks who granted them land and peace; then against the 
Bolsheviks who signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and requisitioned their 
stocks of grain; and finally toward the Bolsheviks once the phony phrases 
about democracy and the Constituent Assembly were revealed to be "only a 
screen to conceal the dictatol-ship of the landowners and capitalists. ,143 
4 2 1 7  Uchv-editel'noe sobranie i diktatura proletariata," 
~ o l n o e  sobranie sochinenii, 5th edition, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi 
iteratury, - , pp. 6-7; English translation in V. I. Lenin, 
gollected w',","k",,1!~6~d~~n (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964-1970), 
m, pp. 253-275. 
43. Lenin, - PSS, XL, p. 17; Collected Works, XXX, p. 268. 
The relative strength or weakness of class and nationality in various 
areas of the empire were crucial in determining the lines of battle and the 
commitment of actors. In the great sweep of the Russian Revolution and 
Civil War nationalism was still largely a phenomenon centered in the ethnic 
intelligentsia, among students and the lower middle classes of the towns, 
with a t  best a fleeting following among broader strata. Among 
Belorussians, Lithuanians, and Azerbaijanis, rather than a sense of 
nationality, the paramount identification was with people nearby with 
whom one shared social and religious communality. For these peoples 
neither nationalism nor socialism was able to mobilize large numbers into 
the life and death struggle than being waged across the land. 
For several other nationalities, among them the Latvians and 
Georgians, class-based socialist movements were far more potent than 
political nationalism. Socialism as presented by the aominarit intellectual 
-elite answered -the grievances of both social and ethnic inferiority and 
promised a socio-political solution to the dual oppression determined by class 
and nationality. For still other nationalities, like the Ukrainians and the 
Estonians, nationality competed with a sense of class for primary loyalty of 
the workers and peasants. In the absence of detailed social historical 
studies of the national borderlands, it is still too early to achieve a full sense 
of the reasons why neither a political class consciousness nor a political 
nationalism dominated among these peoples. For the Armenians, a rather 
unique case of a people divided between two empires, without a secure area 
of concentration, and faced by the imminent danger of extermination, a non- 
class, vertically integrating nationalism ovel-whelmed all competitors. 
Nationalism, like class consciousness, was a disturbingly ephemeral 
phenomenon among most non-Russians in these turbulent years, especially 
once the revolution outgrew the cities. Whatever their cultural and 
ethnographic preferences, non-Russian peasants did not autonlatically opt 
for the national program of their urban ethnic leaders. Mobilized in the 
aftermath of the October Revolution, the peasantry was, in Eley's words, 
a class restlessly in motion -- passing in and out of 
armies, regular and irregular; migrating for food and 
work, over shoi-t and long distances; experimenting with 
the full repertoire of violent, direct-action, and peaceful 
protests; meeting locally to discuss and formulate 
grievances; combining more ambitiously at the district 
and regional levels; issuing petit' ns; instructing 
deputies; and, of course, voting. 48 
The reasons for the relative weakness of nationalism in 19 17- 1918, 
and even further into the Civil War, require further attention by scholars, 
but tentatively one might suggest that the social distance between villagers 
and townspeople, between peasants and intellectuals, was great enough to 
make the supraclass appeal of nationalism difficult to buy. The most 
successful appeals were populist or even socialist, especially when they were 
enhanced by ethnic arguments. Furthermore, long-established trade 
patterns and con~plex econolnic relations tied most of the non-Russiar, 
peoples of the old empire to the center (Finns and Poles are perhaps an 
exception here). The way the empire had developed economically was a 
powerful force for integration with the rest of Russia rather than for 
separate nations. Separation from Russia was almost always a political 
decision based on need for support by an outside power, at first Germany, 
later the Entente powers, and had far less intrinsic appeal to the mass of 
the population than has been customarily accepted. 
The ebb and flow of socialism or nationalism was tied to the ebb and 
flow of the war and revolution, to the relative fates of Great Powers, their 
ability to act within Russia. In the twentieth century intervention has 
44. Eley, "Remapping the Nation," p. 42. 
become an unwelcome but ubiquitous guest a t  the revolutionary table. 
When Bolsheviks were relatively weak and Germans strong, separatism and 
the fortunes of the nationalists rose; when the Germans were defeated and 
the Entente withdrew, the appeals of the Bolsheviks in favor of social 
revolution, land to the peasants, and even a kind of greater Russian 
"nationalism" found supporters. Neither nationalism nor a sense of class 
were ends in themselves for ordinary people, as they often were for 
intellectuals. They resonated within the demokratiia in so far as they were 
believed to be means to solving the aggravated social dislocation that had 
only gotten worse with war and revolution. 
Turning to the Ukraine, Lenin writes that the importance of the 
national question was evident there, as demonstrated by the Constitutent 
Assembly election results in which Ukrainian SRs and socialists 0-utpolled 
the Russian. "The division between the Russian and UErairiian Socialist 
Revolutionaries as  early as 1917 could not have been accidental." But 
Lenin does not see the evident national sentiments -- which I have 
emphasized were extremely closely tied to the particular social and political 
conjuncture of these years -- as fixed or permanent. Indeed, his argument is 
that internationalists must be tolerant of the changing national 
consciousness of non-Russians, which, he was confident, was part of the 
petty bourgeois vacillation that had been characteristic of the peasantry 
throughout the Civil War. 
The question whether the Ukraine will be a 
separate state is far less important [than the 
fundamental interests of the proletarian disctatorship, 
the unity of the Red Army, or the leading role of the 
proletariat in relation to the peasantry]. We must not be 
in the least surprised, or frightened, even by the prospect 
of the Ukrainian workers and peasants trying out 
different systems, and in the course of, say, several 
years, testing by practice union with the RSFSR, or 
seceding from the latter and forming an independent 
Ukrainian SSR, or various forms of their close alliance.. . . 
... the vacillation of non-proletarian working people 
on such a question is quite natural, even inevitable, but 
n o t m e  least frightful for the proletariat. It is the 
duty of the proletarian who is really capable of being an 
internationalist.. . to leave i t  to the non-proletarian 
masses themselves to get rid of his vacillation as a 
result of their own experience. 45 
Lenin's estimation that national separatism would be reduced by 
central Russian tolerance and a willingness to allow national self- 
determination to  the point of independence has appeared, understandably, 
to be either a utopian fantasy or an example of political dissembling. But if 
in fact nationalism was far weaker than most nationalists have allowed; if 
in Russia i t  was almost invariably connected with real social and political 
discontents caused by years of discrimination and hardship under tsarism; 
and if, indeed, significant groups within the non-Russian peoples responded 
well to the socialist programs of social transformation and national self- 
determination, then perhaps Lenin's views on the near future of the 
nationalities was less a fantasy than another example of his political style, 
an uneasy combination of hard-nosed realism and the willingness to take 
extraordinary risks. 
Ronald Grigor Suny 
The University of Michigan 
45. Lenin,-PSS, XL , p. 20; Collected Works, XXX, p. 271. 
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